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Reconsidering the Commission's Treatment
of Tribal Courts

I. Introduction
Since the U.S. Sentencing Commission first enacted
the federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Guidelines have
treated tribal courts in a manner that is impossible to
reconcile with other modem federal policies of respect
for tribal self-determination and self-governance. In refusing to count tribal convictions for purposes of routine
calculation of criminal history, the Commission has disrespected tribal courts. The Commission's tribal courts
policy is anachronistic and out of step with modem efforts
to support tribal courts.' The Commission should amend
the guidelines to reflect the principle that misdemeanor
convictions from tribal courts are entitled to the same
level of respect as misdemeanor convictions from state,
county, and municipal courts.
II. The Status of Tribal Courts in Federal Sentencing
In making criminal history one of the two key determinants, the Commission gave enormous weight to a
defendant's past criminal conduct, reflecting the notion
that recidivism was a very important ingredient of the
Commission's sentencing policy.
A. Importance of Past Convictions in Guideline
Sentencing
The Commission determined that municipal, county and
state court sentences would be counted in the criminal history calculation' and that sentences from tribal courts and
foreign courts would be considered only in extraordinary
circumstances. Thus, under the Guidelines as enacted
and as applied today, a tribal or foreign court sentence is
3
not routinely counted in criminal history computations,
4
but constitutes a "favored" basis for upward departure.
B. Tribal Courts and Foreign Courts
At first glance, one might conclude that the Commission
was merely seeking to be respectful of tribal sovereignty
in treating Indian tribes akin to foreign nations. Although
the authority of tribal courts, like the authority of foreign
courts, arises from a source of sovereignty that is foreign
to the states and the United States, tribal and foreign
courts ought not to be likened to one another. Chief
Justice John Marshall famously held that tribes are not
foreign nations, and are more correctly denominated

"domestic dependant nations." 5 Unlike foreign courts,
tribal courts have an integral role to play in the criminal
justice regime within the boundaries of the United States.
Offenders travel to and from Indian reservations far more
freely and more often than between the United States
and foreign nations. Moreover, it is far easier for federal
courts to obtain cooperation from tribal courts that lie
wholly within the United States (and the territorial reach
of federal courts).6
Since only tribal courts have jurisdiction over certain misdemeanor offenses on Indian reservations, the
structure of the federal Indian country criminal justice
system reflects, in effect, a partnership between the federal
government and the various tribal governments. The role
of tribal courts is essential to the maintenance of public
safety and public order in these communities. In contrast,
foreign courts lack any important role in the domestic life
of the United States. Thus, tribal courts and foreign courts
are quite different.
C. Tribal Courts and State Courts
An obvious alternative to treating tribal courts like foreign
courts is treating tribal courts like state courts. Though
the Commission did not spend a lot of time deliberating
as to whether to count state court sentences in computing federal sentences, 7 it likely believed state sentences
to be trustworthy because states are bound to provide
substantially the same procedural protections to criminal
defendants that federal courts must provide.
This argument, while true, fails to distinguish state
courts in any meaningful respect from tribal courts;
both must provide substantially the same federal protections to criminal defendants. Indeed, the history is
illuminating on this question. As a practical matter, the
Supreme Court held during the nineteenth century that
the federal Bill of Rights does not apply of its own force
to states or tribes." During the decades-long incorporation controversy, the Supreme Court came to decide
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated most of
the federal criminal procedural protections. The peak
of this activity occurred during the Warren Court era.
As the interminable process of federal litigation in the
Supreme Court gradually began to impose more and more
of the federal criminal procedural protections on state
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courts, in 1968 Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights
Act. 9
In one fell swoop, tribes were required to provide most
of the criminal procedural protections found in the Bill
of Rights.'" Long after Congress enacted the Indian Civil
Rights Act, states were still aggressively litigating against
the notion that the federal Constitution required them to
provide certain rights. For example, when the Indian Civil
Rights Act was enacted, the Supreme Court had not yet
rendered its decision in Duncan v. Louisiana," holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. Likewise, the Court had
not yet rendered its decision in Benton v. Maryland,"
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Fifth Amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy which
prevents a state from prosecuting a defendant twice for
the same offense. Finally, the Court had not yet rendered
its decision in Schilb v. Kuebel,3 in which the Court made
explicit its assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
excessive bail.
Thanks to these decisions, it was not long after enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act that the Supreme
Court ordered state courts to meet the same high standards of procedural protection already required of tribal
courts. But the timing is noteworthy and it bears emphasis: tribal courts were requiredby Congress to provide
numerousprotectionsto criminaldefendants before states
recognizedsuch requirements.
Today, the nature of the due process protections in
state and tribal courts is virtually identical. Though tribal
courts and state courts traveled different paths, all must
now provide most of the substantive protections set forth
in the Bill of Rights.
Empirical evidence suggests that tribal courts routinely
hear the same kinds of misdemeanor cases that state courts
4
handle. In the 1999 Means v. Navajo Nation decision,'
the Navajo Nation Supreme Court noted that its lower
courts adjudicated 27,602 cases in the previous fiscal
year. Of these cases, more than twenty percent were
adjudications of the offense of driving while intoxicated
and more than twenty percent were adjudications of
crimes against persons, such as simple assault. Based on
these statistics, the court summarized the criminal work
of the lower Navajo courts as "addressing the serious
criminal and social problems of drunk driving, assaults
and batteries (including aggravated assault and battery
with deadly weapons), sex offenses against children,
disorderly conduct, and public intoxication." Thus, tribal
courts seem to have caseloads similar to misdemeanor
state court dockets. "
Most tribal judicial systems are structured very much
like the state and federal court systems; state and federal
law heavily influence tribal court procedures. Some tribal
courts "operate as nearly exact replicas of state courts."' 5
Commentators have occasionally challenged the quality
of tribal courts, but the same kinds of criticisms are
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frequently raised against rural state courts 6 and it has
not been argued that sentences from such courts should
be discounted. In sum, it is difficult to find compelling
practical or legal differences between state and tribal
courts.
Since courts serve as the primary instruments of
criminal justice for communities, the message that this
conveys is that states and cities are entitled to respect,
but tribal communities are not. Such an approach raises
serious questions.
D. The Limited Right to Counsel in Tribal Court
Despite all the similarities, there is one key distinction between tribal courts and state courts. Although the Indian
Civil Rights Act insures that defendants have a right
to counsel to assist in the defense of criminal charges
in tribal courts, Congress pointedly refused to impose
on tribal governments the principle first announced in
Johnson v. Zerbst,' 7 and applied to the states in Gideon
v. Wainwright,'8 that such counsel must be provided at
government expense.' 9 Accordingly, unlike state courts,
tribal courts are under no federal requirement to provide indigent defense counsel or public defenders for
misdemeanor defendants."
Those concerned with the quality of justice in tribal
courts frequently cite this fact in attacking tribal courts.2 '
While this might be considered a serious flaw by those
concerned with the rights of criminal defendants in
tribal courts (and this author agrees that such criticism
is legitimate), such a concern should not prohibit the
counting of tribal court sentences from the vast majority
of tribal courts. First, a substantial number of tribal
governments now exceed the bare requirements of the
Indian Civil Rights Act and provide indigent counsel
to tribal defendants." In some tribal courts, provision
of indigent counsel is a matter of court rules and local
practice. In others, it is mandated by the tribal code."3 In
any event, because many tribes routinely provide attorneys
to indigent defendants, lack of counsel is not a legitimate
basis for refusing to count the sentences from those tribal
courts. Second, there are simple ways to differentiate
between those tribal convictions in which such counsel
was provided and those in which this was not the case.
Thus, it is difficult to defend the notion that tribal courts
ought to be treated more like foreign courts than like state
courts.
Ill. The Status of Tribal Courts in Federal Law, Policy
and Criminal Justice
In the last thirty years, the United States has broadly
and comprehensively embraced a new official policy that
favors federal support of tribal self-governance. Since
President Richard Nixon first outlined a detailed policy in
favor of tribal self-determination in 1970, every American
President has voiced strong support for the notion that the
federal government should encourage, support, and even
honor tribal governmental institutions. In keeping with
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presidential directives, the Department of Justice issued
an official policy on "Indian Sovereignty and Governmentto-Government Relations with Indian Tribes" indicating
that the Department "is committed to strengthening and
assisting Indian tribal governments in their development
and to promote tribal self-govemance."4 Numerous Executive Branch and independent agencies have followed
suit.
Following the lead of the Executive Branch, Congress
has adopted the tribal self-determination policy as its own
by creating or amending programs throughout the federal
government to accommodate and embrace tribal selfdetermination." 5 Congress has singled out tribal courts and
has repeatedly expressed its confidence in, and support of,
these growing institutions."6 Among other developments,
Congress has required all courts in the United States to
grant full faith and credit to certain kinds of tribal court
judgments:

27

Nowhere is the federal government's respect for tribal
courts more visible than in the federal courts. In 1985, in
National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe, 2
the Supreme Court adopted a rule requiring exhaustion
of tribal court review of federal questions regarding the
scope of tribal jurisdiction, making tribal courts, if not
master of their own universe then, at least, gatekeepers to
the federal courts for questions of their own jurisdiction
under federal law. In light of this case and many others,
tribal courts "have an increasingly important role to play
in the administration of the laws of our nation," in the
9

words of Justice O'Connor.2

A. Tribal Courts and Tribal Criminal Justice
Though the federal Indian country criminal justice regime
has been described as complex,'" tribal courts play a
definitive role in it. They do not possess jurisdiction over
non-lndians,' but tribal courts do possess jurisdiction
over crimes committed by tribal members 3' and other
Indians. 3 Indeed, federal and state courts generally lack
jurisdiction over what is likely the largest category of crime
in Indian country, misdemeanor offenses committed by
one Indian against another. Tribal court jurisdiction is
therefore generally exclusive in this respect. 4 The fact that
Congress has left the tribes with exclusive jurisdiction over
misdemeanor offenses is evidence that it expects tribal
courts to exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction." If tribal
prosecutors and tribal courts do not act, these offenses,
such as the 27,602 misdemeanor offenses on the Navajo
reservation in a recent year, will go unpunished, 6 creating
de facto prosecution-free zones.
Congress indicated in 2000 that "the rate of violent
crimes committed in Indian country is approximately
twice the rate of violent crime committed in the United
States as a whole[.]"

7

The Department of Justice found

that Native Americans experience violent crime at the rate
of about one violent crime victim in every eight residents.
This compares to a rate of one in sixteen for African
Americans and one in twenty for whites.' In such a high
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crime environment, many would agree that one of the
most important components of crime control is insuring
9
that misdemeanor offenses are addressed
B. Federal Courts and Tribal Criminal Justice
Unlike misdemeanors, the federal government exclusively
prosecutes approximately two dozen offenses, characterized in federal law as the "major crimes," when committed
on a reservation. 4° This jurisdictional scheme creates what
is, in effect, a partnership with federal courts handling
the major crimes (felonies) and the tribal courts handling
other offenses (misdemeanors).4'
Congress and the Supreme Court have expressed their
recognition of the increasing importance of tribal courts
in our federal statutory and common law criminal justice
scheme. The interconnectedness of tribal courts with
federal criminal justice and federal courts with tribal
criminal justice suggests an unjustifiable asymmetry in
the Guidelines' refusal to count tribal court convictions
in determining an offender's criminal history score.
With this background, let us now evaluate the policy
implications of the Commission's treatment of tribal
court convictions.
IV. Practical and Theoretical Problems with the
Commission's Current Policy
Most of the key institutions of the federal government
have agreed that federal policymakers should shift decision making to tribal governments where possible, give
respect to tribal institutions, and consult with and seek
the guidance of tribal governments on matters that peculiarly affect Indian people. In light of its policy on tribal
courts, the Commission is out of step with virtually every
other department of the U.S. Government. Its policy is
also inconsistent with the theoretical underpinnings of its
sentencing regime.
A. Inconsistency with Underlying Sentencing Policy
The Guidelines were created to reduce disparity in federal
sentencing and to insure that each defendant is sentenced
with due regard to his culpability as measured by the
current offense and previous offenses. 4" The current policy
simply fails to meet the purposes of accuracy and fairness
that are among the stated bases for the Guidelines. A
defendant with a lengthy tribal criminal history who lacks
any state or federal convictions will be routinely treated as a
first-time offender by the federal courts and hence receive
a shorter sentence than his criminal history score might
otherwise justify. While the Commission declined to adopt
43
a single overarching theory of the purpose of sentencing,
it drew upon retributivism as well as utilitarian theories of
deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. 44 According
to the Commission's rationale for using criminal history
as a key basis of sentencing, "[a] defendant with a record
or prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first
45
offender and thus deserving of greater punishment."
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Such a justification is impossible to square with the
Commission's failure to count tribal court sentences.
Similarly, the Commission has justified the use of
criminal history by explaining that one of the best predictors of future criminal conduct is past criminal conduct.
It has argued, therefore, that use of criminal history is an
important means of crime control through incapacitation
of likely future offenders. 46 If the retributivist theory,
or any of the utilitarian theories, is legitimate, the high
crime rate involving Indians would seem to justify the
use of tribal criminal records. Thus, the Commission's
policy of ignoring tribal court sentences is impossible
to square with it own stated policies as to the goals of
sentencing.
B. The Broader Context
One way to evaluate the Commission's policy is to look at
the actions of the federal courts. If the activity of federal
judges in using trial court records as a basis for upward
departure is any guide, many of the judges who apply
the Guidelines seem not to share the Commission's
lack of respect for tribal court sentences. Despite the
general rarity of upward departures, federal judges have
often used the existence of a lengthy tribal criminal
history to justify an upward departure in Indian country
47
cases.
Likewise, federal district court judges often use tribal
convictions as predicates for the transfer of juvenile
offenders to adult status. 4' Because the facts of such cases
usually justify discretionary transfer, the appeals courts
have not had to reach the question as to whether the tribal
convictions are predicates for mandatory transfers. In
any event, federal judges have found the records created
by tribal courts to be trustworthy, despite the serious
ramifications for youthful defendants.
Even state courts and legislatures, though they have
long competed with tribal courts for jurisdiction, 49 have
begun to embrace the notion that tribal court dispositions
are worthy of reliance in state criminal proceedings and for
other purposes. At least five states, including Michigan,
Montana, New Mexico, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, allow
prior tribal court convictions to serve as predicates for
enhanced charges for subsequent state prosecutions for
driving under the influence of alcohol.' ° At least nine
states honor tribal court sentences in the context of
sex offender registries.5 ' Still other states rely on tribal
convictions in a variety of other contexts, such as treating
them as predicate offenses for enhancement of sentences
in domestic violence prosecutions 5 and even computing
criminal history for sentencing purposes. 3 In sum, in a
number of substantive areas, state courts trust tribal court
convictions.
Thus, in addition to being out of step with federal
policy, the Commission's position on tribal courts seems
anachronistic in comparison to the respect that state
legislatures and courts are beginning to give tribal court
criminal convictions.
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V. Harmonizing Federal Indian Country Sentencing with
Current Federal Indian Policy and the Commission's
Sentencing Theory
The Commission should recognize that tribal courts are
substantially more like state courts than foreign courts
and should accord tribal courts the same respect that they
receive from the rest of the federal government.
One obvious way to accomplish this is simply to
eliminate the Guidelines provision indicating that "sentences resulting from tribal court sentences are not to be
counted." 4 Such an amendment, which would change
the default rule to one of routine consideration of tribal
court sentences, would both improve the accuracy of the
criminal history for any individual defendant and correct
the current policy's apparent lack of respect for tribal
courts.
As for the concern about the lack of a federal requirement for provision of indigent defense counsel in tribal
courts, the Commission could choose to consider only
those tribal convictions and sentences resulting in imprisonment in which a defendant was represented by counsel.
Such a determination may not be required under federal
law but is nevertheless justifiable given the importance of
the institutional role of defense counsel in the American
criminal justice system. Such an approach would address
legitimate federal concerns in a manner that is respectful
to tribal courts. Moreover, it might encourage tribes to
provide indigent counsel.
However, from the standpoint of federal Indian policy, a unilateral directive from the federal government
as to how tribal sentences will be used in federal courts
may not be the ideal approach for furthering tribal selfgovernance. Instead, an alternative approach, consistent
with the notion of the United States' government-togovernment relationship with Indian tribes, might give
individual tribal governments the ultimate power to determine whether their tribal convictions should be used
in federal sentencing. In other words, the Commission
should modify the Guidelines to create the default rule of
respect for tribal court sentences as outlined above, but
the Commission could further recognize a tribal government's right to "opt-out" of the scheme by indicating that
their sentences should not be considered in federal sentencing. Such a policy would make the tribe the ultimate
decision maker.
The "tribal option" approach can be criticized on the
grounds that it would less fully address the inaccuracies in sentencing caused by the failure to count tribal
convictions. However, reasonable accommodations for
tribal sovereignty and tribal self-governance should trump
general sentencing policy, particularly when the case is
federal only because it arises in Indian country and Indian
defendants are being sentenced.
One potential objection to the tribal option approach is
that, on its face, if seems to give tribal governments greater
control over federal consideration of tribal sentences than
states have over federal consideration of state sentences.
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The Guidelines do not allow states a parallel "opt out"
option. Tribal governments, however, have a fundamentally different relationship with the United States than
states have. Constitutional limits prevent the federal government from displacing state governments for purposes
of routine felony prosecutions. 55 Congress has, however,
unilaterally and explicitly authorized the exercise of power
on Indian reservations that it could never exercise outside
the federal reservations. 56 Thus, the federal government,
with the blessing of the Supreme Court, has unilaterally
limited the criminal justice authority of tribal governments to misdemeanors5 7 Given the unilateral nature of
this federal action, tribes ought to have some power to
moderate how much they wish to participate in a system
that was, after all, forced upon them. Precedent for such
unique treatment of tribes is well established; Congress
recognized that tribes ought to be treated differently than
states in 1994 when it created a tribal option as to the
federal death penalty, but offered no such option to the
8
states.5
VI. Conclusion
The Commission stands as perhaps the only important
federal governmental agency with an official policy of
disrespect for tribal courts. By ignoring tribal sentences,
the Guidelines have institutionalized a policy of disrespect for tribal courts and the important work that they do
addressing public safety issues in tribal communities. In
the light of the prevailing norm oftribal self-governance in
federal Indian policy and the underlying Guideline policies
of retributivism and incapacitation of recidivists, the
Commission's decision not to credit the legitimate work
of tribal courts in adjudicating misdemeanor sentences is
indefensible. The Commission should reconsider Section
4 Ai.2(i) which prevents tribal court sentences from being
used in the routine calculation of criminal histories. The
Commission should change its tribal courts policy and
recognize that the sentences of tribal courts are entitled
to the same respect as state court sentences in the federal
sentencing regime.
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